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Essays
WHAT IS A TORT CLAIM? AN INTERPRETATION OF
CONTEMPORARY TORT REFORM
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM*
INTRODUCTION
One of the most common questions raised on the first day of
torts class is, "What is a tort?" On their first day of law school,
students falter until, eventually, it emerges that a tort is a civil wrong
not arising out of contract. This almost completely circular defini-
tion is not enlightening, and that is part of the lesson. Unless you
already know what constitutes a civil wrong, the definition is useless.
And once you know what constitutes a civil wrong, the definition is
unnecessary. In this Essay I shall explore the changing character of
the civil wrongs that are governed by "accident law"-negligence
and strict liability for personal injury-by looking at the implications
of recently proposed and enacted tort reforms for our conception of
the nature of a tort claim in this field.
In the last ten years, both proposed and actually adopted acci-
dent law reforms have proliferated. The scope and magnitude of
these reforms are unparalleled in the history of tort law. They have
come from the left, the center, and the right; they have involved
medical, products, environmental, and other forms of liability; and
they run the conceptual gamut from tinkering with tort law doctrine,
to imposing liability for creating the risk of harm, to wholesale sub-
stitution of no-fault compensation schemes for tort liability. Both
academic analysis and partisan debate over the wisdom and practi-
cality of these reforms has been and continues to be intense. In
short, tort law is in considerable turmoil and there is no end in
sight.
It would be a mistake to try to find a single central message in
all of this analysis, debate, and reform, for the subject is not mono-
lithic. Some proposals and analyses have been based on the asser-
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tion of principle, some on pragmatic judgments about the most
workable mix of tort law, regulation, and insurance, and some have
been transparently self-serving. Nonetheless, it has been common
to divide contemporary tort reform into two categories: reforms
that would increase the scope of tort liability and reforms that would
decrease it. This is obviously a useful classification, for it captures
what is important to those who are immediately affected: whether a
reform produces more or less liability, more or less compensation.
This concern with whether plaintiffs or defendants gain an immedi-
ate benefit from a reform, however, obscures something else that is
beginning to happen, and that I think will continue to happen in
contemporary tort law.
At the core of our traditional conception of a tort claim are two
notions: the right to individualized determination of the defend-
ant's liability, and the right to custom-tailored compensation for the
actual loss suffered by the claimant. The particular circumstances of
the claim play an essential role in such a conception. But the com-
bined effect of a number of the reforms that have surfaced in recent
years is the erosion of this conception. In one way or another these
measures de-emphasize the particulars of the individual claim.
In eroding the traditional conception, the reforms seem to me
to be significant in two related ways. First, they promote a version
of equity among claimants that both accords a priority to the com-
pensation of out-of-pocket loss and reduces the risk of disadvantag-
ing members of particular groups.' Second, the reforms import into
tort law some of the more appealing (though to some people, unap-
pealing) features of non-tort compensation systems-workers' com-
pensation, auto no-fault, and private and social insurance. Because
non-tort compensation systems tend to standardize claims and re-
coveries at the expense of individualization, it is no surprise that the
two effects of recent reform are related. Indeed, the evolving con-
ception of a tort claim reflects the effort to have what some reform-
ers may think is the best of two worlds-the imposition of liability
on particular wrongdoers that is at the core of tort liability, and the
1. In some respects this de-emphasizing of the particulars of individual claims re-
flects a focus on distributive instead of corrective justice-that is, on the overall distribu-
tion of goods in society, rather than on the obligations of particular defendants to
particular plaintiffs. For discussion of this distinction, see generally Jules L. Coleman,
Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits (pts. 1 & 2), 1 LAW & PHIL. 371 (1982), 2 LAw
& PHIL. 5 (1983). But as I shall try to show in the remainder of this Essay, more is at
issue in contemporary tort reform than whether to pursue corrective or distributive jus-
tice through the imposition of tort liability.
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standardization of recovery that is at the core of health and disability
insurance and other non-tort compensation systems.
At the outset a word about the character of my inquiry is in
order. I do not contend that the authors of contemporary tort re-
forms have consciously attempted to change our conception of what
it means to have a tort claim. On the contrary, most of those in-
volved in tort reform, whether in litigation, in the legislatures, or in
the pages of law reviews, are concerned mainly with expanding or
contracting liability, not explaining or even understanding the juris-
prudential significance of the reforms they propose. And because I
want not only to describe the recent past but also to predict the
future course and significance of reform, my analysis covers both
reforms that already have been enacted and those that are being
given serious consideration-though I do not include proposals for
reform that are at this stage mere pie-in-the-sky. For all these rea-
sons, I shall offer what I describe as an interpretation-a reading of
the major features of contemporary tort reform, designed more to
uncover their ultimate meaning and significance than to assess their
immediate impact.
I. THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION
The traditional conception of a tort claim is rooted in the no-
tion that every claim is unique. This conception is reflected both in
the rules of law that govern the making of tort claims and in the
manner in which they are implemented. There is individualization
throughout: in the application of liability standards,2 in the rules
governing causation,' and in the assessment of the claimant's
4damages.
A. Liability Standards
From the time of its emergence as the dominant standard of
liability for accidental harm, negligence has been defined as the fail-
ure to exercise the care that would be reasonable under the circum-
stances.5 Although, as Holmes suggested over a century ago,6 our
notions of negligence might well have crystallized into a set of cate-
2. See infra Subpart I.A.
3. See infra Subpart I.B.
4. See infra Subpart I.C.
5. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing (N.C.) 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837);
see also 3 FOWLER HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.2, at 389 (2d ed. 1986).
6. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 98-99 (Mark D. Howe ed., Bel-
knap Press 1963) (1881).
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gorical rules delineating the kinds of behavior that do or do not sat-
isfy the negligence standard, this kind of crystallization never
occurred. On the contrary, even the nineteenth century per se no-
duty rules have slowly eroded in favor of submission of negligence
claims to juries for decision. 7 The result is that at least in principle
every negligence case is unique, for the law makes no effort to treat
it as a member of a general category governed by a legal rule.8 The
only precedent that most negligence cases set (and the major rule
that most follow) is that because reasonable people could disagree
about whether the behavior involved was negligent, the case should
be submitted to the jury.
In the fields of accident law dominated by strict liability rather
than negligence the situation is similar. The defectiveness of a par-
ticular product's design and the adequacy of the warning it carried
may be litigated time and again, even though the same design and
warning are involved in each separate case. In environmental liabil-
ity, the law on the books is that the courts, not juries, are to decide
such questions as whether a particular activity is "abnormally dan-
gerous" and therefore warrants the imposition of strict liability for
the injury it causes. 9 The test for what constitutes an abnormally
dangerous activity, however, requires consideration of six different
and largely incommensurable factors.' ° As a consequence, the im-
position of this form of strict liability is highly context dependent,
and per se rules govern its application to only a few especially dan-
gerous activities such as blasting. In most other situations the
7. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from
the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976).
8. Admittedly, in certain other respects even traditional negligence law does not
attend to the unique facts of the case at hand. For example, the external standard used
to determine whether the defendant was negligent abstracts from the defendant's own
circumstances and disabilities in evaluating the quality of his or her conduct. See GuIDo
CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATrITUDES AND THE LAw 24 (1985) (discussing the "reason-
able person" standard); David Rosenberg, Damage Scheduling in Mass Exposure Cases, I
COURTS, HEALTH Sci. & L. 335, 339 (1991) ("[Tihere is no mistaking the averaging de-
sign of the external, reasonable person standard of the negligence rule.").
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. 1 (1965).
10. As delineated in the Second Restatement of Torts, these are:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from [the activity] will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on;
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
Id. § 520.
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unique circumstances of each case must be considered in determin-
ing whether to impose strict liability for the consequences of the
activity.
What is true of liability standards themselves is also true of
most available defenses. It is now the law in most of the country
that the doctrine of comparative negligence does not bar a plain-
tiff's recovery, but instead reduces the size of that recovery in pro-
portion to the amount of negligence attributable to the plaintiff."
Whether comparative negligence or contributory negligence is in
force, however, each doctrine focuses on the particular character of
the plaintiff's conduct under the circumstances of the case. The
same is true of certain other defenses to both negligence and strict
liability, including product misuse and assumption of risk.' 2
B. Causation
The notion that each tort claim is unique also is reflected in the
traditional rules governing proof of causation. The plaintiff must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, but for the defend-
ant's conduct, the plaintiff would not have suffered the loss in ques-
tion. ' I admit that this but-for test in a sense divorces the causation
issue from the unique facts of the case at hand because the jury must
decide what would have happened had the defendant not been neg-
ligent (or not engaged in a strict liability activity). Because by hy-
pothesis the defendant was negligent (or engaged in a strict liability
activity), this decision requires a counterfactual inquiry involving
one important "fact" that differs from the case at hand.
Nonetheless, the focus of the causation inquiry on the unique
facts of the individual case does emerge, and nowhere more than in
the rules regarding what cannot count as evidence of causation.
"Naked" statistical evidence regarding the probability that the de-
fendant's action caused the plaintiff harm is inadmissible,' 4 with
11. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §§ 1.1, 1.4-1.6 (2d ed.
1986).
12. See, e.g., Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 578 (N.Y. 1976) (overturning
the "patent-danger" rule, which barred recovery for injuries resulting from a patent,
rather than a latent, danger).
13. See 4 HARPER et al., supra note 5, § 20.2, at 91.
14. See, e.g., Guenther v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 406 F.2d 1315, 1318 (3d Cir. 1969)
(evidence that defendant manufactured 75% to 80% of tires in stock not sufficient for
plaintiff to get to jury); Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754, 755 (Mass. 1945)
(evidence that defendant operated a bus route at approximate time and place of plain-
tiff's collision with bus not admissible on question of defendant's ownership of particu-
lar bus). See generally David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard:
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 51:172
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only a few exceptions. 5 The result is that the jury is not permitted
to base its decision on evidence about causation in other situa-
tions.' 6 When there simply are no particular facts (or there are in-
sufficient facts) on which to base a causal determination, the plaintiff
has failed to make out a prima facie case and the defendant wins
automatically.
Moreover, the essence of the traditional causation requirement
is that the action of the defendant must have wronged the plaintiff
by causing him or her actual physical harm. That is, the defendant's
actions must not only risk harm to the plaintiff, but that harm, or a
harm very much like it, must actually occur.' 7 The idea that tort
liability is imposed only when the defendant's actions have caused
physical harm to the plaintiff is so obvious that it is almost transpar-
ent, but it is a critically important feature of the traditional concep-
tion of accident law. Without an actual-harm requirement, the
plaintiff is a mere member of the public toward whom the defendant
behaved improperly, and the imposition of liability on the defend-
ant-however measured-begins to resemble criminal punishment
for wrongdoing to the public at large rather than the rectification of
a wrong to a particular individual. The actual-harm requirement
thus makes the unique causal connection between the defendant's
action and plaintiff's harm the focus of inquiry.
C. Damages
Without question, the rules governing recovery of damages in
tort cases most clearly reflect the traditional conception of the uni-
queness of every tort claim. The successful plaintiff is entitled to
Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 AM. BAR FOUND. REs. J.
487.
15. See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 476-77 (Wash. 1983)(jury permitted to determine whether physician's failure to diagnose illness in timely
fashion was proximate cause of death, upon evidence that decedent's chance of survival
was reduced from 39% to 25%).
16. The members of the jury are of course permitted to generalize from their own
experience in and understanding of the physical world in order to answer the
counterfactual causal inquiry. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how the causal inquiry could
be resolved without reference to such experience and understanding, unless it were by
reference to statistical generalizations.
17. On at least some views of the matter it also is not sufficient that the defendant
harmed the plaintiff; harm to the plaintiff must also have been foreseeably risked. See
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928). In addition, in at least some
situations the type of harm risked, and not some other type, must have occurred in order
to hold the defendant liable. See Petition of Kinsman, 338 F.2d 708, 726 (2d Cir. 1964)
(defendant liable only if injury to plaintiff caused by failure to raise a drawbridge before
bridge was struck by drifting vessel was foreseeable).
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recover individualized and unlimited damages for past and future
out-of-pocket expenses such as lost wages and medical costs, and
for past and future pain and suffering. Evidence of awards made to
others who have suffered similar injuries not only is not binding-it
is not even admissible; the jury does not hear of other awards and
cannot consider them in assessing damages. The principle of indi-
vidualization is so strong, in fact, that a "thin-skull" rule prevails,
under which a plaintiff who is especially susceptible to injury may
recover in full.18
Even the major exception to this principle of individualized full
recovery confirms it. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence,
the negligence of the plaintiff does not bar recovery, but merely
reduces the plaintiff's recovery in proportion to the amount of neg-
ligence attributable to him or her.'9 The baseline against which this
reduction occurs, however, is full and individualized recovery; com-
parative negligence thus maintains tort law's allegiance to this prin-
ciple of individualized recovery even while creating an exception to
it.
In summary, the individualized character of the determinations
that make up the traditional conception is evident when the rules
governing standards of conduct, causation, and damages described
above are considered together. And they have been surprisingly re-
sistant to change. I think that the traditional conception has been so
appealing because resolution of personal injury claims in court,
before juries, has remained important. Part of this appeal is rooted
in the ideal of corrective justice, under which a wrongdoer is re-
quired to rectify the harm done to his or her victim.
But in my view more is at stake than this simple, sometimes
primitive, and in the modem context, often impossible ideal. 20 Also
at stake is the idea that, without the aid of the government and the
18. See, e.g., Steinhauser v. Hertz, 421 F.2d 1169, 1173-74 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding
that plaintiff is entitled to recover in full if jury finds that accident was "precipitating
factor" causing schizophrenia in child, who previously exhibited latent schizophrenic
tendencies).
19. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 11, § 2.1, at 30-32. The same approach is used in juris-
dictions where comparative negligence also applies in strict liability actions. See, e.g.,
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1168-69 (Cal. 1978) (proportionately re-
ducing plaintiff's recovery where plaintiff failed to use safety belts and door locks, and
was driving while intoxicated).
20. The ideal of corrective justice is often impossible to achieve in a number of re-
spects. For example, the "wrongdoer" may be an individual employee of a legal con-
struct-a corporation-but the corporation is likely to be the defendant; the basis for the
imposition of liability may not be that the defendant is a "wrongdoer," but that the
defendant should be held liable notwithstanding the absence of wrongdoing; and the
[VOL. 51:172
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whole apparatus of the criminal law, ordinary aggrieved citizens can
put authority on trial. That idea has become part of the democratic
ideal in this country, and tort law is a major vehicle through which
that confrontation occurs, 2' or at least seems to occur. We have
been willing to tolerate much that is unattractive and unfair about
tort law in order to permit ordinary people to sue large institutions
for malpractice, defectively designed products, and hazardous expo-
sure to pollutants. There have always been alternatives, but they lie
outside the tort system-stronger regulation for deterrence, and no-
fault systems like workers' and auto compensation schemes. But,
for two reasons, until recently there did not seem to be any feasible
way to extend the compensation systems beyond employment and
auto injuries: it appeared necessary to cut back on tort liability in
order to extend these approaches into other fields, and that was po-
litically difficult. Further, because of the difficulty of defining the
events that would trigger a right to compensation, there did not
seem to be any technically feasible way to construct workable no-
fault systems of compensation in other fields.2 2
What is now beginning to happen is that tort law is groping
toward an arrangement that circumvents these difficulties by main-
taining the right to sue in tort, while at the same time importing
some of the more attractive features of non-tort compensation sys-
tems into tort law. The importing has begun to occur and will con-
tinue, I think, both because the alternatives are attractive in their
own right, and because they would remedy some of the weaknesses
of tort law that we once were willing to tolerate, but which have
become increasingly objectionable. Of course it is open to question
what the future will bring, for my analysis is almost as much a pre-
diction of what is going to happen as it is a description of what has
already happened. But a great deal has already happened, and
in any case the role of the legal scholar sometimes is to help us see
defendant's insurance company, not the defendant, may provide the funds that "cor-
rect" the "wrong."
21. See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Authority in the Dock, 69 B.U. L. REV. 469
(1989).
22. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, The Insurance Implications of Alternative Compensa-
tion Systems, 25 Hous. L. REv. 817 (1988) (arguing that the difficulty of defining compen-
sable events in product and process injuries, including environmental exposure injuries,
makes expansion of health and disability coverage in private first-party and social insur-
ance policies a more viable alternative than no-fault insurance schemes); James A. Hen-
derson, Jr., The Boundary Problems of Enterprise Liability, 41 MD. L. REV. 659 (1982)
(discussing problems in defining compensable events under an enterprise liability sys-
tem for technologically advanced activities).
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where we are going. That is what I will try to do in the following
discussion.
II. THE IMPACT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON
THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION
The decade of the 1980s was a period of enormous ferment in
tort law scholarship and tort law reform. Significant new proposals
for reordering tort law emerged,"3 the liability insurance "crisis" of
the middle of the decade catalyzed support for some of these pro-
posals, and tort reform statutes of one sort or another were enacted
in over forty states.24 In addition, judicial action in a series of mass
tort cases experimented with new approaches on a number of differ-
ent fronts. 5
Although this scholarship and the legislative and judicial action
that it helped to spawn are diverse, one discernible theme is the ten-
dency of many of the reforms to depart from the traditional concep-
tion of the uniqueness of every tort claim. Each of a series of
reforms would erode (or has begun to erode) this traditional con-
ception, by rendering the particular circumstances of the plaintiff or
defendant less significant to the outcome of the claim than they
would have been in the past. Interestingly, this common character-
istic links together a number of otherwise quite different reforms.
Some of these expand the scope of liability, by imposing liability
measured by the degree of risk imposed on the plaintiff.26 Others
contract liability, by reversing the traditional "collateral source"
23. For a compendium, synthesis, and analysis of much of this scholarship and law
reform, see generally the two-volume AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE REPORTERS' STUDY, EN-
TERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY (1991) [hereinafter ENTERPRISE RESPON-
SIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY]. See also TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Peter H.
Schuck ed., 1991) (discussing tort reform controversy).
24. For a catalogue of the reforms that were adopted by statute, see Joseph Sanders
& CraigJoyce, "Offto the Races ": The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous.
L. REV. 207, 220-22 (1990).
25. See, e.g., In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990) (overruling
district court's "imaginative approach" that had required full trial on liability for 11 class
representatives using evidence from 30 illustrative plaintiffs, enabling jury then to deter-
mine damages suffered by remaining 2990 class members); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus.,
782 F.2d 468, 475 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming district court's ratification of plaintiff class
in mass-tort asbestos action, using bifurcated trials to determine punitive and actual
damages separately). See generally PETER H. SCHUCR, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1986)
(examining judicial approaches to Agent Orange litigation and suggesting alternatives);
Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659 (1989)
(examining judicial approaches to asbestos-related and Dalkon Shield litigation, and
suggesting alternatives).
26. See infra Subpart II.A.
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rule or by placing caps on damages recoverable for pain and suffer-
ing.27 Some facilitate the institution of tort claims by breaking down
barriers to class actions,28 while others make it more difficult or im-
possible to bring tort actions by authorizing waivers or disclaimers
of tort liability.29
A. Liability for the Tortious Creation of Risk
Perhaps the most radical of all the measures that would erode
the traditional conception of a tort claim involves liability for the
tortious creation of risk. A cluster of recent proposals and judicial
decisions has begun a process of eliminating the actual harm re-
quirement of tort law. Each reform makes the unique facts of the
plaintiff's claim less important to his or her rights of recovery than
they would be traditionally. In each instance, this departure is ac-
complished by measuring liability according to the degree of risk
imposed on the plaintiff rather than by the amount of actual harm
the plaintiff suffered.
The extreme form of liability for risk creation is liability im-
posed even before anyone suffers actual physical harm. A number
of commentators and a few cases have advanced this idea.3 ° They
would compensate those subjected merely to the risk of harm-for
example, because they were exposed to a carcinogenic substance-
and would measure liability by multiplying the probability that the
risk will materialize in harm by the expected magnitude of loss
should it occur. If a plaintiff had a twenty-five percent chance of
contracting cancer because of a tortious exposure to a carcinogen,
she would receive twenty-five percent of the value of a claim for ac-
tually contracting the disease. A modified approach would measure
liability in roughly the same manner, but would create a "fund" into
which the defendant's payment would be made. Those who subse-
quently suffered injury would then be entitled to recover from the
fund, based on the probability that their harm was caused by a party
contributing to the fund.3"
27. See infra Subpart 11.B.
28. See infra Subpart II.C.
29. See infra Subpart II.D.
30. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 321-22 (W.D.
Tenn. 1987) (approving "enhanced risk" or "enhanced susceptibility" to disease as
compensable injury); Glen 0. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tor-
tious Risk, 14J. LEGAL SmUD. 779, 783 (1985) (arguing that the basic objectives of tort law
are better served if liability is based on risk of injury rather than on actual occurrence of
harm).
31. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 341-42 (suggesting that firms potentially
1992]
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A less extreme approach would impose liability for risk only af-
ter harm had already been suffered. This approach may be starting
to become commonplace. Perhaps the most well-known example is
market-share liability, adopted most prominently in a number of
DES cases, 2 and sometimes employed in asbestos claims as well.33
In such cases, each of many companies has marketed a generically
identical or nearly identical substance; a large number of individuals
are able to prove exposure to the substance and the occurrence of
harm resulting from that exposure, but are unable to identify the
particular defendant or defendants responsible for his or her expo-
sure. Traditional rules governing proof of causation would leave
such a plaintiff without a viable claim, because proof of any individ-
ual marketer's responsibility for the plaintiff's exposure would be
impossible. Even proof that a particular company had marketed
more than fifty percent of the substance in question would not sat-
isfy the burden of proof under the traditional rule that naked statis-
tical evidence is inadmissible. 4
Market-share liability responds to this problem of the indeter-
minate defendant by permitting the plaintiff to recover from each
liable for claims involving toxic exposure set aside a fund, or purchase commercial in-
surance to cover such claims); Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for
Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439 (1990) (arguing in favor of increased risk of harm
as a compensable event). In a sense, this modified approach departs even more radically
from the traditional conception of a tort claim than does the pure approach. Under the
pure approach the imposition of liability on the defendant and the receipt of compensa-
tion by the plaintiff are simultaneous. There is a direct, face-to-face connection between
the plaintiff and the defendant in the course of the claim, and the judgment rendered
obligates the defendant to pay the plaintiff. But under the modified approach the de-
fendant does not pay the plaintiff directly; it pays into a fund that later pays the plaintiff.
This separation of the imposition of liability from the payment of compensation
may seem to be merely formal. From the plaintiff's standpoint the defendant pays the
plaintiff, and the plaintiff cannot recover unless he or she has been harmed by the de-
fendant. On the other hand, from the defendant's standpoint, its liability is not to an
individual or even to a group of individuals. Rather, the defendant is liable to a kind of
intermediary-the fund created by its payment of the judgment against it. The identities
of the individuals whose harm the defendant's actions have risked are immaterial to the
defendant. By the time this risk materializes in harm, the defendant's legal relationship
with and obligation to these individuals has terminated. In effect, the defendant has
paid a tax calibrated to the riskiness of its activities and that tax has been used to finance
a system that will later be used to compensate those who subsequently become victims
of these activities.
32. Diethylstilbestrol (DES) was marketed as a prescription drug for the prevention
of miscarriage, and was later alleged to cause cancer in daughters of some women who
took DES during pregnancy. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 925 (Cal.
1980) (holding defendants liable in proportion to their share of the DES market).
33. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex.
1981).
34. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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marketer of the offending substance in proportion to the market
share of that defendant. There need be no showing that the plaintiff
was in fact exposed to any individual defendant's product.35 The
theory behind the doctrine rests on the probability that each de-
fendant's product injured someone, and that such injury is highly
likely to have occurred in proportion to each defendant's market
share. By foregoing the requirement that a plaintiff prove causation
in the traditional manner, those deserving of compensation receive
it, and potential defendants are threatened with liability in propor-
tion to the degree of harm that their actions caused. In the long
run, in theory, each defendant will end up paying the same sum that
it would have paid had perfect evidence of causation been available.
In order to achieve this result, however, each defendant is held lia-
ble in proportion to the risk that its actions created rather than for
the actual harm it caused a particular plaintiff.
The practical difficulties of implementing a market-share liabil-
ity scheme are great, but these difficulties are beside the point. For
my purposes here, the important point is that market-share liability
marks a distinct departure from the traditional conception of a tort
claim. It simply does not matter whether a particular defendant in a
market-share case actually injured the plaintiff or not, for a defend-
ant's action and the plaintiff's harm need not match. Any defend-
ant's wrong now consists of having risked harming the plaintiff,
rather than of having actually caused the plaintiff harm. Each plain-
tiff is a surrogate for all the parties whom a defendant actually in-
jured, even though the defendant may not have injured that
plaintiff. One traditionally essential set of particulars about the
plaintiff's claim has therefore become completely irrelevant.
What market-share liability does in a narrow range of cases,
other recent proposals and a few cases would accomplish much
more broadly. These measures would extend the theory behind
market-share liability to cases in which there is a form of direct evi-
dence of the degree of risk imposed on the plaintiff by the defend-
ant. Where market-share liability uses market share as a proxy for
risk, these approaches would use epidemiological or other statistical
35. In some jurisdictions a defendant may avoid liability by showing that the plaintiff
could not have been exposed to that defendant's product. For example, the defendant
may show that during the years in question it made no sales in the state where the plain-
tiff resided. See, e.g., McCormack v. Abbott Lab., 617 F. Supp. 1521, 1526 (D. Mass.
1985). In other jurisdictions, however, even this showing will not suffice to exonerate
the defendant. See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1074-75 (N.Y.
1989).
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measures of the degree of risk imposed on the plaintiff by the de-
fendant.3 6 It is important to recognize that these approaches would
not merely set aside the traditional prohibition against the use of
naked statistical evidence to prove causation. Rather, they would
impose liability even when statistical evidence showed that it was
less probable than not that the defendant's actions caused the plain-
tiff's harm. In such cases, the plaintiff would recover only the per-
centage of his or her losses equal to the percentage probability that
the defendant's actions had caused the losses.
Proportional liability for creating risk thus resembles market-
share liability in the way it departs from the traditional conception
of a tort claim.3 7 Because there is no requirement of a match be-
tween the defendant's actions and the plaintiff's harm, even a de-
fendant that probably has not harmed the plaintiff may be required
under this approach to compensate the plaintiff for a portion of his
losses. The basis of the plaintiff's claim has been transformed into a
demand for compensation that depends much less than a traditional
claim on the particulars of the parties' circumstances.
One point of significance about these different moves toward
imposing liability for creating risk is that they are a response to the
difficulty of creating non-tort compensation systems in the fields
where proving causation is so difficult for plaintiffs. A primary fea-
ture of any liability or compensation system is the compensable
event, or trigger of the right to compensation. That event may be
defined by reference to fault, cause, or loss.3 The principal techni-
cal problem that has prevented the development of no-fault medi-
cal, products, and environmental-injury compensation schemes
analogous to those governing auto and work-related injuries is the
difficulty of constructing a satisfactory set of compensable events.
36. See, e.g., Herskovitz v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 479 (Wash. 1983)
(measuring damages in a wrongful death case by the percent reduction in chance of
survival); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984).
37. Like market-share liability, this approach is fraught with practical problems, not
the least of which is the potential unreliability of the statistical evidence on which it
would rely. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The
Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845, 867 (1987) (noting that "the data neces-
sary to support the probabilistic measures of causation that could serve as surrogates for
causal responsibility will rarely be available").
38. In tort, the dominant compensable event is the occurrence of an injury resulting
from the fault of the defendant. By contrast, in workers' compensation and automobile
no-fault insurance the event is an injury caused by employment or while driving. In
health and disability insurance (private or social), the event is a loss falling into the
appropriate category, regardless of fault or cause.
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Because it is considered highly desirable to internalize within the
health-care, products, and chemical industries the cost of injuries in
each field, cause-based compensation systems are preferred. Other-
wise, it would be technically more sensible (though in all probability
financially impossible) simply to adopt loss-based systems providing
universal health and disability insurance, instead of trying to charge
each activity with the cost of providing no-fault compensation for
the injuries associated with the activity.
Proposals for imposing tort liability for the creation of risk re-
spond to this problem 9 by circumventing it. When tort liability is
imposed for the creation of risk, then many of the knotty problems
that would be associated with the definition and proof of a compen-
sable event under a non-tort, no-fault compensation system are
avoided. Certainly, it would be equally possible to avoid these tech-
nical problems within a no-fault compensation system by paying
claimants for exposure to risk rather than for actual harm. Circum-
venting the problem within the tort system, however, avoids a polit-
ical obstacle to the construction of such a non-tort system. To set
up such a system outside tort law might require abolishing or re-
stricting tort liability. Setting it up within tort law does not abolish
or restrict tort liability;4 ° on the contrary, it expands the scope of
tort liability and thereby avoids both the technical and the political
obstacles to the construction of a full-blown compensation scheme.
The result looks something like a compensation system operat-
ing in court. A true system of liability for risk creation would dis-
pense compensation on a much more uniform basis than would
traditional tort liability, because it would base awards on potential
loss rather than actual loss, and inevitably there would be less indi-
39. There actually are two problems: (1) it is sometimes difficult to know whether a
particular injury was caused by the activity in question (medical care or exposure to a
product or environmental hazard, for example); and (2) even assuming that the injury
was caused by the activity in question, not all such injuries must be included within the
compensation system to assure optimal internalization of the cost of injuries associated
with the activity. Examples in this category might include a minor side effect of benefi-
cial medical treatment or an accidental cut caused by a sharp knife. Imposing tort liabil-
ity for risk creation responds more to the first than to the second problem.
40. At the very least, tort liability appears to be expanded under this approach. To
be entirely consistent, of course, damages should be calculated in proportion to risk
regardless of the percentage probability that the defendant's action caused the plaintiff
harm. .For example, if a defendant is liable for 30% of a claimant's loss when there is a
30% chance that the defendant caused the loss, then the defendant should be held liable
for only 70% of the loss when the chance that the defendant caused the loss is 70%. If
under a new regime the defendant were held liable only for 70% of the loss in the latter
situation, then liability would have been contracted in this respect, because under tradi-
tional rules the defendant would pay 100% of the loss in such a situation.
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vidualized damage computation when the plaintiffs had not yet suf-
fered injury. That this all appears a bit jerry-rigged and therefore
only vaguely resembles the non-tort compensation systems with
which we are familiar may be part of the point: that is sometimes
what happens when you take a fish out of water.
B. Damages
If liability for creating risk appears only vaguely to be moving
the tort system toward the standardization that is so characteristic of
non-tort systems, recent reforms in the law of damages move tort
law in that direction with a vengeance. I shall discuss three such
reforms here: statutory caps on the sums recoverable as damages,
proposals for scheduling damage recoveries, and abolition of the
collateral source rule.
1. Caps on Damages for Pain and Suffering.-Perhaps the most vis-
ible reform enacted in the wake of the liability insurance crisis of the
mid-1980s was the statutory cap on pain and suffering damages.4'
Typically set at a figure of $250,000 or higher, these caps are
designed at least in part to preclude the occasional enormous judg-
ment resulting from a "runaway" jury. Statutory caps also respond
in a crude way to the argument that because it would make little
economic sense for potential victims to insure themselves against
pain and suffering, tort law should not impose liability for this form
of loss.
There are plausible (though in my view unconvincing) argu-
ments for completely abolishing the right to recover pain and suffer-
ing damages.42 Yet, if the right of some victims to recover in full for
their pain and suffering is abolished, then the principle that under-
lies retention of the right of full recovery of such damages by other
victims demands explanation. It might be argued, for example, that
statutory caps simply recognize that it would be unreasonable for a
jury to assess the present value of any individual's pain and suffering
41. Between 1985 and 1988, 23 jurisdictions placed caps on damage recoveries. See
Sanders & Joyce, supra note 24, at 220-22.
42. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 228-35 (1987)
(arguing that socially ideal compensation cannot be achieved under a liability system
that compensates for nonpecuniary losses); Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Non-Pecuniary Loss and
Breach of Contract, I IJ. LEGAL STUD. 35 (1982) (exploring "inefficiency" of full compen-
sation for nonpecuniary losses resulting from breach); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Prod-
ucts Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 362-67, 408-11 (1988)
(contending that tort liability should apply only to pecuniary losses while nonpecuniary
harm should be covered by a legislatively-mandated system of fines).
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at a level in excess of the cap in question, because no amount of
pain and suffering could rationally be valued in excess of the cap.
On this view, a cap assures that what is already irrelevant is not
given weight nonetheless. But given the fact that juries commonly
awarded sums in excess of what later became the statutory cap in
particular jurisdictions, this argument is weak. An occasional jury
might be regarded as utterly irrational; but common awards above a
specified level suggest (even if they do not prove) that it is not irra-
tional so to assess the value of certain kinds of pain and suffering.
The operative principle behind caps is more likely to be that,
although some claimants incur pain and suffering that could legiti-
mately support awards in excess of the cap, some such excess
awards are the result of inaccurate or punitive assessments. In or-
der to avoid the latter, the caps are formulated to preclude the for-
mer as well.
Another plausible but ultimately unconvincing explanation for
caps is that the real function of pain and suffering damages is to
provide the claimant with a method of financing activities that be-
come more desirable to him or her as a result of his injury-the
projected cost of which normally is not recoverable as an out-of-
pocket loss. The permanently injured athlete may wish to purchase
a wide-screen television and season tickets to the local team's
games, for example. Because it would be very rare that the present
value of such expenses would exceed the statutory cap, the cap
serves to prevent overcompensation for this category of expense.
The weakness of this explanation, however, is that there is no neces-
sary connection between the degree of a claimant's pain and suffer-
ing and the magnitude of the expense the claimant is likely to incur
in order to engage in substitute activities. In addition, this theory
cannot begin to explain awards made for lost enjoyment of life's
activities to comatose claimants or others who could not possibly
use their awards to finance the purchase of substitute enjoyments.
Whatever the motive for the enactment of statutory caps on
pain and suffering damages, and regardless of whether there is a
coherent principle underlying them, the effect of the caps is clear.
Statutory caps compromise the traditional principle of full compen-
sation for both economic and noneconomic loss suffered by a suc-
cessful tort claimant. A cap renders irrelevant to the plaintiff's
claim any pain and suffering that would be assessed a value in excess
of the cap. The unique circumstances of those seriously injured vic-
tims whose pain and suffering would fall into this category therefore
are ignored. In jurisdictions that have enacted caps, for all intents
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and purposes a tort claim is no longer an action for full recovery of
damages suffered by very seriously injured or exceptionally sensitive
claimants. These claimants, not tortfeasors, bear the risk that they
will suffer unusually severe pain and suffering.
2. Damage Scheduling.-A number of proposals for limiting the
individualization of damage awards in other ways have recently
emerged. 43 These proposals would subject awards for pain and suf-
fering to "schedules" defining the lower and upper limits of awarda-
ble damages for particular kinds or categories of loss. The most
straightforward of these proposals would categorize typical injuries
according to their severity,4 4 and would prescribe the range of
awardable pain and suffering damages for each category. The
amount awardable for a temporary minor injury such as an improp-
erly set fracture would be lower than that awardable for a perma-
nent major injury such as blindness or the loss of a limb.45 A
broader version of this approach would apply it not only to awards
for pain and suffering, but to damages for economic loss as well.
The plaintiff simply would receive a lump sum chosen from within a
pre-specified range applicable to the category in which his or her
injury fit.
Glen Robinson and I recently have proposed an analogous but
more far-reaching scheme for "aggregative valuation" of claims in
mass tort actions.4 6 Under our proposal, the early claimants would
try or settle their claims pursuant to traditional rules governing re-
coverable damages. These results would then be aggregated and
used as the basis for constructing damage "profiles" for each cate-
gory of loss. Later claimants' recoveries would be subject to the up-
per and lower limits specified in the profiles. Because these profiles
would be constructed from data regarding actual awards and settle-
43. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & Glen 0. Robinson, Aggregative Valuation of Mass
Tort Claims, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1990, at 137. See generally Rosenberg,
supra note 8 (proposing damage scheduling through averaging and prioritizing compen-
sation in lieu of individual awards);James F. Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort Reform: Develop-
ing Better Tools for Assessing Damages for Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 171 (1991)
(proposing development of a reporting system that would have precedential value for
future awards); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain
and Suffering, " 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908 (1989) (proposing three alternative frameworks to
perfect valuation of noneconomic damages under the current system of liability).
44. Depending on the complexity of the schedule, it might take into account the
severity of the injury, its degree of permanence, and the life expectancy of the party
injured.
45. See, e.g., Bovbjerg et al., supra note 43, at 921-22 (tables summarizing a sample of
jury awards).
46. See generally Abraham & Robinson, supra note 43.
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ments in the same action, they necessarily would take into account
the discounting of these awards and settlements by juries or the par-
ties themselves because of such nondamage-related issues as negli-
gence and causation. Unlike more conventional damage scheduling,
our approach therefore would take into account not only the sever-
ity of injury suffered, but also the strength or weakness of other ele-
ments of the claim.
There is one sense in which the effect of all damage scheduling
could resemble the effect of statutory caps. If the highest category
on the schedule had an upper limit, then the most severely injured
or especially sensitive claimants would bear the same risk of suffer-
ing above-ceiling losses as they would when a statutory cap was in
force. The highest category in a damage schedule need not have a
closed end, however, although many of the proposals for scheduling
seem to assume a closed end. In any event, the interesting features
of damage scheduling lie in their effect throughout the schedule,
not merely at the high end.
First, scheduling renders irrelevant the special severity of the
losses suffered by claimants falling into any of the schedule's catego-
ries. The claimant with an extraordinarily painful broken arm finds
himself undercompensated for his pain and suffering if under tradi-
tional rules he would have recovered more than the schedule allows
him.47 Indeed, if the schedule applies to both pain and suffering
and economic loss, some claimants could find that they are not even
fully compensated for their medical expenses and lost wages, be-
cause their losses in these categories alone exceed the upper limit
allowed for a broken arm. Second, unlike the statutory cap, damage
scheduling inserts a floor under which awards for a particular cate-
gory of injury may not fall. Not only is the special severity of an
injury or the claimant's special sensitivity irrelevant; the unusual
mildness of the injury or the claimant's insensitivity to the injury
also does not count. The claimants who heal far more quickly than
the average person or who work in spite of their pain can pocket
their awards with impunity, though presumably the awards made to
such claimants will be at the low end of the scale.
In short, damage scheduling standardizes awards by treating
47. Of course, it is possible to imagine damage schedules that create only rebuttable
presumptions and therefore permit the claimant to show that, because of the unusual
severity of the injury, the upper limit applicable to that kind of injury should be relaxed.
See id. at 147-48. Such an approach will tend to have fewer of the effects I point to in the
text, but because of the typical operation of even rebuttable presumptions, these effects
still are likely to appear to some degree.
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claims that otherwise would not be alike as though they were alike.
The claims that would be outliers in any given category are brought
back within a normal distribution of awards. Like the outlier claims
that are subject to caps, some of these would have been the result of
jury error, but some simply would have warranted special treatment
under the traditional conception of a tort claim. Plaintiffs whose
claims might lie outside the high end of any particular schedule bear
the risk that they will be less than "fully" compensated because their
special characteristics are not taken into account. In contrast, de-
fendants bear the risk that outliers on the low side will be more than
"fully" compensated for the same reason. In both instances, how-
ever, the unique circumstances in which the plaintiff finds himself or
herself--circumstances that play such a central role in the assess-
ment of damages under the traditional conception of a tort claim-
are of only limited significance in fixing the amount of the award the
plaintiff receives.
3. Collateral Sources.-The traditional "collateral source rule"
governs the tort law treatment of collateral sources of compensation
for the plaintiff's losses, such as health or disability insurance. The
rule provides that evidence of past or probable future payment of
such benefits to the plaintiff is inadmissible in the trial of a tort ac-
tion.4 8 The result of this rule of evidence is of course also substan-
tive: the plaintiff is entitled to recover in full from the defendant for
losses that already have been or will in the future be paid by collat-
eral sources such as first-party or social insurance.
The standard critique of the rule has been that it is inappropri-
ate to impose liability on a defendant for sums that the plaintiff has
not in fact lost, because she is insured. The standard responses
have been that these losses are a real social cost even if the plaintiff
has not lost them, and that optimal deterrence therefore requires
that the defendant be threatened with liability for all the costs of its
activities; that the plaintiff should not be denied the benefit of his or
her foresight in purchasing insurance; that because plaintiffs often
do not receive compensation for some losses, duplicate recovery for
other losses helps to make them whole; and that in any event double
compensation of the plaintiff can be avoided by permitting the
plaintiff's insurer to contract for a right of reimbursement for its
payments out of any subsequent tort recovery that the plaintiff
secures. 49 For years the traditional rule held out against its critics,
48. See 4 HARPER et al., supra note 5, § 25.22, at 648-51.
49. See 1 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 23, at 162-64.
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but then it began to crumble. In the 1970s several jurisdictions
abolished it by statute in medical malpractice cases;50 in the 1980s a
larger number abolished it (again by statute) in all tort claims. 5' In
these jurisdictions, past and prospective insurance benefits paid or
payable to the plaintiff are offset against the plaintiff's recovery.52
The recent reversals of the collateral source rule present a
more complicated picture than either statutory caps or damage
scheduling. These reversals might be interpreted to have trained
more rather than less attention on the particular circumstances of
the plaintiff in a tort claim. In my view, however, these changes rep-
resent a move in the opposite direction. For the most part, recent
modifications of the collateral source rule run with rather than
against the grain of the other changes I have been canvassing.
The opposite argument, that reversal of the traditional rule rep-
resents a move toward rather than away from individualization, is as
follows. The collateral source rule ignores differences among plain-
tiffs, because in computing the plaintiff's losses it precludes consid-
eration of any collateral compensation received by the plaintiff for
those losses. By requiring that such collateral payments to the
plaintiff be taken into account in computing damage awards, statu-
tory reversals of the rule (according to this view) increase the focus
of the tort action on the plaintiff's particular circumstances-in this
instance, the plaintiff's access to insurance against some of the very
losses that he or she has sued to recover.
For two reasons, however, I think that this interpretation does
not fit the facts as well as a very different interpretation. First, the
notion that the collateral source rule ignores the plaintiff's access to
50. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A Preliminary Analysis, 36 MD.
L. REV. 489, 504-06 (1977) (discussing potential modifications of the collateral source
rule); Prentiss E. Feagles et al., Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the
Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417, 1447-50 (citing California, Idaho, Iowa,
New York, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee statutes).
51. In total, 25 jurisdictions have now enacted some form of legislation governing
the collateral source rule. See Sanders & Joyce, supra note 24, at 220-22 (table listing
those states enacting such legislation between 1985 and 1988).
52. Strictly speaking, in some of these jurisdictions the rule has not been completely
abolished because the statutes abolishing the rule apply only to specified sources or
exclude specified sources from their application. In addition, decisions in a number of
federal cases have ruled the statutes inapplicable to certain federal social insurance pro-
grams, on the ground that the abolition would interfere with the federal statutory rights
of reimbursement accorded some of these sources of social insurance. See, e.g., Rubin v.
Sullivan, 720 F. Supp. 840, 846 (D. Haw. 1989) (disallowing matching funds under
Medicaid); Abrams v. Heckler, 582 F. Supp. 1155, 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (upholding
regulation precluding Medicare payments for services covered by auto insurance
policies).
1992]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
collateral sources is overly simple. In fact, the rule is responsive to
these sources even as it prohibits reference to them at trial. Health
and disability insurers usually provide in their policies that they shall
be subrogated to the rights of their insureds against third parties
who have caused these insureds to suffer losses covered by the pol-
icy. Statutes creating social insurance often do the same. In each
instance, insurers' rights of subrogation may be exercised directly
against these third parties-such as tortfeasors-or the subrogation
rights may be translated into the right to be reimbursed for the
amount of these insurance benefits out of any tort recovery secured
by the policyholder. In practice, these rights of subrogation and re-
imbursement are not exercised systematically, but they are
exercised. 3
Consequently, the assertion that the collateral source rule ig-
nores the differential availability of insurance benefits to plaintiffs is
far from accurate. The rule actually attends to these differences by
permitting the creation of a fund out of which insurers can be reim-
bursed for the benefits they have paid. 4 In the absence of the rule,
private and social insurers' rights of subrogation and reimburse-
ment are far less meaningful. Requiring that a plaintiff's past and
future access to insurance benefits be ignored in court was tradi-
tional tort law's method of distinguishing those who did and did not
have such benefits. Abolishing the rule means the opposite: a
plaintiff's status as an insurance beneficiary is no longer protected,
and those who do and do not have insurance receive the same net
compensation.
The second reason I interpret recent abolitions of the collateral
source rule to be departures from the traditional conception is a bit
more subjective. The collateral source rule has a moralistic quality
about it, in that it seeks to assure that those who have been provi-
dent enough to purchase insurance are not denied the benefit of
that providence. Yet, although the citizens of this country are far
from being fully insured against the economic consequences of ill-
ness and injury, first-party and social insurance are no longer the
uncommon or nonexistent phenomena they were at the time the
rule came into existence and received this kind of moralistic sup-
53. For explanations of the reasons for this unsystematic exercise of insurers' rights
of subrogation and reimbursement, see 1 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL IN-
JURY, supra note 23, at 164.
54. See John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54
CAL. L. REV. 1478, 1498-1512 (1966) (outlining several methods by which insurers ob-
tain reimbursement).
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port. For example, most Americans have health insurance; 55 virtu-
ally all the employed have workers' compensation covering them
against wage losses resulting from work-related accidents or dis-
ease;56 Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) provides nearly
the entire working population with subsistence-level insurance
against wage loss resulting from permanent disability;57 and a much
smaller but still significant percentage of the working population is
covered against wage loss by private disability insurance. 58
The statutory abolitions of the collateral source rule that have
been adopted in many states are at least partly a reflection of this
growth in the forms and scope of loss insurance coverage protecting
the American public. These statutes recognize that loss insurance is
so widespread that it is the rare plaintiff whose losses are not cov-
ered in some respect by one or more sources of private or social
insurance. Admittedly, abolition of the collateral source rule places
the precise character of the plaintiff's collateral sources of coverage
at issue in each individual tort claim; but from a broader perspec-
tive, such abolition emphasizes what most tort claimants have in
common-collateral sources of insurance coverage-rather than
isolating the particular circumstances that distinguish one plaintiff
from another. In this respect the abolition of the collateral source
rule is a move away from rather than toward the traditional concep-
tion of a tort claim.
To sum up, the three reforms of damages law that I have can-
vassed in this Subpart-statutory caps, scheduling, and reversal of
the collateral source rule-are graphic illustrations of both of the
effects of eroding the traditional conception of a tort claim that I
have been underscoring. These reforms help to counteract the po-
tentially arbitrary or discriminatory application of tort law to partic-
ular claimants, and they import into tort law devices that non-tort
systems have used successfully in providing compensation. For ex-
ample, under the traditional rules governing pain and suffering,
55. Most estimates are that between 30 and 37 million people in the United States
(out of a population of 250 million) are uninsured. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE UNINSURED: BACKGROUND DATA AND ANALYSIS 93
(1988); M. Eugene Moyer, A Revised Look at the Number of Uninsured Americans, 8 HEALTH
AFF. 102 (1989).
56. Hawaii was the last state to adopt a workers' compensation law, in 1963. See
ARTHUR 0. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 5.30 (1952 & Supp.
1989).
57. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988).
58. See HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, 1988 UPDATE: SOURCE BOOK
OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA 7 (1988) (table).
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enormous sums may be paid for pain and suffering to a few claim-
ants. At the same time, other individuals' economic losses may go
undercompensated. As it becomes recognized that for practical
purposes a finite amount of money is available to compensate the
victims of accidental illness and injury, this kind of distribution is
transformed into a target for reform. Similarly, the collateral source
rule permits double compensation for expenses that have been paid
by a claimant's own insurance, even while other claimants have not
been fully compensated for their medical expenses or lost wages.
Both statutory caps on pain and suffering and the abolition of the
collateral source rule can be viewed as attempts to reduce this kind
of inequity among claimants, by preserving the large but ultimately
finite sum that is available to compensate tort claimants for those
who are most in need-victims with uncompensated out-of-pocket
losses.
Proposals for scheduling damage awards would move the sys-
tem toward another form of equity as well. The great strength of
the traditional conception of a tort claim is its capacity to take into
account the individual circumstances of the plaintiff and the particu-
lar chain of events leading to injury. The enormous discretion ac-
corded the jury under this conception, however, also creates the
potential that circumstances that ought to be legally irrelevant to the
outcome of the claim may be taken into account. As groups, Afri-
can-Americans and whites, men and women, the wealthy and the
poor may fare differently as claimants under the traditional concep-
tion. Similarly, individual defendants and corporations, profes-
sional and nonprofessional defendants, local defendants and
foreign defendants may fare differently.59
The various forms of damage scheduling that recently have
been proposed would tend to mitigate different outcomes because
of prejudice or favoritism based on the foregoing factors. Everyone
with the same injury would receive an award within a prespecified
range. Admittedly, the data from which schedules are constructed
might include outcomes based on such prejudice or favoritism. But
by averaging or aggregating the outcomes from a representative
sample of claims, the effect of these biases would be submerged; all
subsequent claimants would receive awards that averaged the posi-
59. For example, one study showed that juries are likely to award substantially more
in product liability, malpractice, or work injury cases than in an automobile case involv-
ing injury of the same severity. See AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS,
EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS 52-56 (1985).
[VOL. 51:172
CONTEMPORARY TORT REFORM
tive and negative differences resulting from the biases.' Thus,
damage scheduling would attempt to avoid the silent inequities that
can be camouflaged by what Holmes called the "featureless general-
ity" of jury verdicts under the traditional conception. 6 t
In addition to the effect of these reforms in the law of damages
on equity among claimants, each reform represents an effort to im-
port into tort law one or more features that are characteristic of
non-tort compensation schemes. Three parallels here are striking.
First, nearly all non-tort compensation systems employ rules gov-
erning coordination of benefits that are designed to avoid duplicate
or overlapping coverage. 62 Private insurance policies accomplish
coordination through policy provisions; social insurance accom-
plishes it through statutory directives or regulations. Along the en-
tire range of compensation systems, the only major exception to this
practice is the collateral source rule of traditional tort law. Aboli-
tion of the rule is therefore a major landmark in the development of
tort law. Abolition not only makes tort resemble other systems; in
this respect it makes tort law one of them.
Second, damage scheduling of tort awards has counterparts in
any number of non-tort compensation systems that use categorical
rules of various sorts to ignore idiosyncracies and differences among
individuals, in the interest of achieving equity among claimants and
increasing administrative efficiency. Examples include the social se-
curity "grid" used to classify disabilities for purposes of SSDI;6 s the
lump sums that workers' compensation pays for designated perma-
nent disabilities;' and the "diagnostic review group" (DRG) limita-
tions on Medicare reimbursements for particular kinds of illnesses
and medical procedures that have been spreading through health
insurance generally.65 These devices are coming to be seen as at-
tractive methods of capturing for tort law some of the efficiencies
and equities generated by non-tort systems, and they are finding
60. See Abraham & Robinson, supra note 43, at 150-51; Rosenberg, supra note 8, at
340-41.
61. HOLMES, supra note 6, at 89.
62. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 133-72 (1986) (discussing the purposes and implications of and devices
for coordinated coverage).
63. For discussion of the promulgation of the grid, and the controversy and litiga-
tion that followed, see JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983).
64. See LARSON, supra note 56, at § 58.00.
65. See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1984)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). For discussion of these limita-
tions, see J. Timothy Phillips & Don E. Wineberg, Medicare Prospective Payment: A Quiet
Revolution, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 27 (1984).
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their way into the tort reform movement in the form of caps on
damages and proposals for damage scheduling.
Finally, aside from tort law, no compensation system explicitly
pays claimants for their pain and suffering, and even those that pay
compensation which might be viewed as a surrogate for pain and
suffering only pay in limited amounts. 66 By foregoing such pay-
ment, these systems make compensation of out-of-pocket loss a pri-
ority, and at the same time avoid the statistical uncertainty that they
would face if compensation of a non-objective category of loss were
available without limit. Statutory caps on pain and suffering reso-
nate with both these concerns.
C. Class Actions and Bankruptcy
In this Essay, I cannot undertake a thorough review of the de-
velopments in class actions and bankruptcy that have occurred dur-
ing the last decade, nor can I do justice to the many innovative
proposals for reform that have emerged during the same period. It
is sufficient to note here that many of the important developments
in class actions and bankruptcy in recent years have occurred in tort
litigation, and that virtually every important actual and proposed
change in the way these fields handle tort claims has had or would
have the effect of rendering the particular circumstances of each
plaintiff's claim less significant than they would have been under the
traditional conception.6 7
The tort system simply cannot resolve hundreds of thousands
of claims through the ordinary process of individual litigation.6' By
their very nature, class actions tend to focus on the general rather
than on the particular. For example, determinations regarding neg-
ligence (or strict liability) and at least some features of causation
often are made generally and become binding on all members of the
class. In addition, in a number of mass tort actions, including asbes-
66. The lump sum workers' compensation payments for specified permanent disabil-
ities bear a close resemblance to pain and suffering damages, though they are not so
denominated. Pain and suffering is also recoverable under automobile uninsured or
underinsured motorist insurance, but the right to benefits is contingent on the existence
of a valid cause of action in tort against the uninsured or underinsured motorist.
67. For fairly recent sets of recommendations, see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COM-
PLux LITIGATION PROJECT, TENTATIVE DRAr No. 1 (Apr. 14, 1989) and TENTATIVE DRAr
No. 2 (Apr. 6, 1990); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON MASS TORTS, REVISED
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1989) [hereinafter COMMISSION ON MASS TORTS].
68. For example, the Agent Orange, Dalkon Shield, and asbestos litigation have in-
volved about 125,000, 210,000, and 340,000 claimants, respectively. See COMMISSION ON
MASS TORTS, supra note 67, at 15e.
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tos and Dalkon Shield litigation, the courts and such ancillaries as
special masters and consultants have constructed schemes that
would encourage or require claimants to be categorized and then
compensated on the basis of that categorization.69 In these cases
the courts have used their class action and bankruptcy authority to
fashion methods of standardizing claims and distributing payment,
all under the rubric of imposing "tort liability.",70 Thus, in a very
real sense the principal point of filing for Chapter Eleven bank-
ruptcy reorganization in response to mass tort litigation is to trigger
judicial authority to treat collectively claimants who otherwise would
have the right to more individual treatment. Finally, much of the
academic writing about class actions and damages in mass tort cases
has been directed at devising satisfactory methods of departing from
the traditional conception of a tort claim, through damage schedul-
ing, aggregative valuation, and the like.7 '
In short, the function of class actions and bankruptcy reorgani-
zation in connection with tort claims is precisely to facilitate the de-
mise of the traditional conception of a tort claim in mass tort
actions. In these settings the law has begun to recognize that, for a
variety of reasons, the individualization that is at the heart of the
traditional conception is an unaffordable luxury. The rules gov-
erning the resolution of tort claims through class actions and bank-
ruptcy-and the innovations that are now being proposed and
seriously considered-make it increasingly feasible to depart from
the traditional conception by paying comparatively less attention to
the particulars of individual claims than would be paid outside these
settings.
D. Waivers and Disclaimers of Tort Liability
The last set of reforms that I shall analyze does not involve
change in the rules governing tort liability or damages, but elective
69. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants' Trust Claims Resolution Facil-
ity, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1990, at 79; McGovern, supra note 25, at 659.
70. In other cases some trial judges have attempted to employ collective devices for
resolving individual issues without great success. See, e.g., In re Fibreboard Corp., 893
F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990) (granting mandamus against trial court's plan to deter-
mine liability and damages for an entire class of 3000 claimants based on a trial of se-
lected claims representing different asbestos-related disease categories). For in-depth
discussion of other innovative efforts that have met with mixed success, see Linda S.
Mullinex, Beyond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32
WM. & MARY L. REV. 475 (1991).
71. Without question, David Rosenberg has been in the forefront of this effort. See,
e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 335.
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substitution of alternative regimes for those rules. At the beginning
of the modem era of tort law, tort liability displaced contract law as
the source of liability for personal injury in settings, including the
delivery of health care and the sale of products,72 where injurers and
victims could have contracted before injury about their rights and
obligations. That displacement did not merely make tort liability
the dominant system for redressing wrongful personal injury; be-
cause tort law could not be set aside by contract, tort liability be-
came the exclusive source of law governing liability for personal
injury. 73 The traditional conception of a tort claim therefore also
became the exclusive reference point for adjudicating personal in-
jury claims. Tort liability could not be waived; it could not be dis-
claimed; and it could not be contracted away.
The citadel that these no-waiver, no-disclaimer, no-contract
rules built is now in the early stages of being dismantled. In the
fields of automobile liability, medical malpractice, and products lia-
bility, limited adoptions of elective no-fault regimes and far-reach-
ing proposals for authorization of liability and compensation
contracts are reordering personal injury law. The common charac-
teristic of these measures, and in a sense their most important fea-
ture, is the suspension of the traditional conception's monopoly in
the field of civil liability. Personal injury law and tort law are no
longer synonymous.
These nontraditional measures can be classified most comforta-
bly along two axes. First, they permit displacement of tort law
either at the election of one party or upon the agreement of both
parties. Thus, an alternative regime may be selected in a number of
ways: only by the claimant,74 only by the injurer, 75 or only upon
mutual agreement. 76 Second, the alternative regime may be se-
72. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 11 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (hold-
ing that purchaser of a vehicle may sue manufacturer for negligence, notwithstanding
absence of privity of contract between them).
73. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 97 (NJ. 1960)
(holding that automobile manufacturer could not use disclaimer of implied warranty to
relieve it of liability when plaintiff was injured because of manufacturing defect).
74. This approach is employed by the National Vaccine Act, which provides no-fault
compensation to individuals suffering side effects from the administration of child vac-
cines. See National Vaccine Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-I to -34 (1988).
75. This approach is employed by the Virginia and Florida birth-injury funds. See
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 766.301-.316 (West Supp. 1989).
76. For proposals in this regard, see 1 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURY, supra note 23, at 487-536; Jeffrey O'Connell, A "Neo-No-Fault" Contract In Lieu of
Tort: Preaccident Guarantees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CAL. L. REV. 898 (1985).
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lected before a cause of action in tort arises, 7 after a cause of action
arises,7 8 or at either point. The result is a combination of different
possibilities, together with variations within each depending on
whether full or only partial displacement of tort law rules governing
liability and damages is permitted. 79 For example, the Virginia and
Florida birth-injury compensation programs8 ° afford obstetricians
and hospitals an annual right to opt out of tort liability for birth-
related neurological defects, but in exercising this right these
health-care providers must opt into a no-fault compensation system
financed by flat surcharges against them. On the other hand, the
federal child vaccine-injury program"' is financed by pharmaceutical
companies, and affords claimants who are already injured a right to
opt into a no-fault compensation scheme that is comparatively less
generous than the tort system has been to successful claimants in
this field.
There are two main features of this entire cluster of possibili-
ties. The first is that they are just that-possibilities. The parties'
relationship need not be completely constrained by tort law in gen-
eral or by the traditional conception in particular. By contract or
(depending on the variation in question) at the unilateral election of
one of the parties, the full individualization required by the tradi-
tional conception may be set aside. Second, in virtually all of these
reforms and proposals, what tort law is set aside for is a set of rights
and liabilities that is far more standardized and far less individual-
ized than tort rights. Typically the claimant under these schemes is
assured full compensation for medical expenses, partial compensa-
tion for lost wages, and sometimes a lump sum equivalent to pain
77. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Medical Malpractice, Imperfect Information, and the Contrac-
tual Foundation for Medical Services, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 201 (discuss-
ing contracts for health services, especially in light of the rise of health maintenance
organizations (HMOs)); Glen 0. Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice
Risks between Patients and Providers, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 173.
78. See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refised: Foreclosure of Personal Injury
Claims By Defendants' Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 589,
601 (1982) (proposing a statute that would give a defendant in a personal injury action
the option of foreclosing such claims by offering, within 60 days, to pay the claimant's
net economic loss, or "special" damages, in excess of losses covered by the claimant's
collateral sources).
79. For example, complete ex ante waiver of tort liability might be permitted, or such
waivers might be permitted only if the potential injurer promised to provide a substitute
compensation package, such as no-fault payment of full economic loss resulting from an
injury for which there would otherwise be tort liability. See id.; Kenneth S. Abraham,
Medical Liability Reform: A Conceptual Framework, 260 JAMA 68, 71-72 (1988).
80. See supra note 75.
81. See supra note 74.
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and suffering damages that is subject to a specified monetary ceil-
ing." There is no need to prove negligence, and in some instances
statutory presumptions of causation eliminate the need to prove
that the claimant suffered actual harm at the hands of the party who
would be a defendant if he were making a tort claim.83
The contract alternatives thus sidestep some of the political dif-
ficulties entailed in the construction and implementation of
mandatory non-tort compensation schemes, and encourage the
more or less voluntary adoption of such schemes. For example,
where the right to opt out of tort liability is unilateral, the political
objections of those who are given that right are likely to fade away,
since they can elect to remain in the tort system. To meet the objec-
tions of those against whom this right is exercised, some quid pro
quo is necessary. This is likely to mean that the compensation
scheme that substitutes for tort liability must be comparatively gen-
erous, either financially or through liberalization of compensability
criteria.
So far the legislatures have chosen to construct these elective
systems themselves, leaving one or both of the parties merely to
elect or not to elect participation in a legislatively specified alterna-
tive to tort law. The next logical step in the development of con-
tract alternatives may well be legislative or even judicial
authorization for potential claimants and defendants to construct al-
ternative systems themselves. Potential parties may then opt out of
tort liability and into those systems by mutual agreement. But, for
two reasons, this next step may be some years away. First, neither
legislatures nor courts are likely to be comfortable with full freedom
to contract out of tort liability before assessing experience with the
more limited regimes that have been adopted. Second, some system
must be devised for bringing into the picture the insurers whose
interests would be affected by individual choices. For example,
when patients or physicians opt out of the tort system, the exposure
of both the physician's malpractice liability insurer and the patient's
first-party and social insurers may be affected; these impacts need to
be considered, and a method of accounting for them through rate
changes, rebates, surcharges, and the like must be devised. Other-
wise some of the principal beneficiaries and victims of a decision to
opt out of tort and into an alternative regime will be left on the
sidelines.
82. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5009 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1991).
83. See, e.g., id. § 38.2-5008.
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If these problems were solved, it is quite possible that permit-
ting the parties to opt out of tort liability by mutual agreement
would generate a whole series of other schemes, custom designed
by the parties for particular kinds of transactions or relationships:
for lawnmower-related injuries, drug side effects, and the like. Leg-
islatures cannot reasonably be expected to formulate such compen-
sation programs individually, but they can be expected to authorize
such contracts in general and establish specific constraints on their
terms.84 Even if the law cannot construct such schemes, it can allow
the parties whose interests would be served by doing so to construct
them. The right to opt out of tort liability would create the opportu-
nity to do just that. The courts could police these contracts, having
received the legislative message that, subject to the legislatively pre-
scribed constraints, waivers and disclaimers of tort liability are pre-
sumptively valid rather than presumptively unconscionable. The
private sector could then proceed to try to solve the technical obsta-
cles to constructing alternative compensation systems.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Because I have claimed not merely to be describing what has
already become tort law, but also to be using proposals for reform
to predict what else will happen to tort law, I want to suggest in this
Part why I think that the future will bring more of the same kinds of
tort reform that I have been emphasizing. I argued above that con-
temporary reform has the effect of promoting greater equity among
claimants. Of course, what counts as equitable or inequitable de-
pends on what factors are considered legally important or irrele-
vant. Identical treatment of all claimants or all defendants is not
equitable if there are relevant differences among members of these
categories. The developments that I have canvassed seem to me
likely to influence several forms of inequity that have long been rec-
ognized in the tort system, but nonetheless have been tolerated. As
these inequities become less tolerable, reforms that respond to
them are likely to be regarded with favor.
One inequity involves differences in the quality of the lawyers
84. These constraints would have to deal with at least two issues: how to establish
the equivalent of "informed consent" or "knowing waiver" by claimants (and those who
might become claimants), and the substantive requirements and limits of the approach
substituted for tort liability. We have considerable experience with the former. As to
the latter, a requirement that the alternative have a monetary value equivalent to the tort
right waived, in light of the probability and severity of potential injury and any price
differential offered in return for the waiver, might provide a suitable baseline.
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representing claimants. Some are adept at proving causation in the
face of scientific uncertainty, some are not. Some are capable of
winning million-dollar verdicts and some are not. By imposing lia-
bility without requiring proof of causation and by standardizing
award levels, a number of the reforms would tend to mitigate the
effect of such differences. Another form of inequity I mentioned
earlier is the possibility ofjury prejudice-racism, sexism, xenopho-
bia, and a variety of other biases. As we become more and more
aware of diversity in our population and more sensitive to that di-
versity, sweeping the possibility of these kinds of jury prejudices
under the rug becomes less and less comfortable, and reforms that
respond to or tend to neutralize the prejudices by standardizing
award levels become more attractive.
A third form of inequity might be called "legal luck." If you are
unlucky enough to fall in your bathtub, you receive limited compen-
sation from health and disability insurance, but if you suffer the
same injury at the hands of a third party like your doctor or the
manufacturer of your car, under the traditional conception the sky is
the limit-you are free to seek the pot of gold at the end of the
rainbow. Few people ever find that pot of gold, and in certain re-
spects, some recent reforms may simply bring the law on the books
into line with the way tort law is actually practiced in most cases
through compromise and settlement. But some of the reforms at-
tempt to contain and manage the differences resulting from legal
luck by shrinking the differences in compensation available from
tort and the other systems, though without eliminating the differ-
ences. The result is a tort system that still has deterrence capacity
and still awards more in damages than alternative systems, but that
generates less difference in compensation levels and therefore
makes people less uncomfortable about the effect of legal luck. 5
85. In a somewhat similar manner the imposition of liability for creating risk might
be interpreted as a method of dealing with "legal luck" from the defendant's rather than
the plaintiff's perspective. Under the traditional conception, either there is full liability
or there is none. The party who has acted negligently, but has the luck not to have
caused injury, escapes entirely, while the defendant who is negligent in the same way,
but unlucky enough to have injured someone, may have to shoulder enormous liability
for the injuries its actions caused. Morally speaking, the defendant whose risky actions
do not cause injury stands in the same position as the defendant whose actions do. See
Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 439, 453 (1990). Liability for creating risk would diminish this distinction without
a moral difference among defendants. Admittedly, however, two different factors tend
to mitigate the effect of these forms of legal luck for defendants: liability insurance and
the repeat-player phenomenon. By insuring, the potential defendant can transfer to an
insurance pool the risk of having the bad luck of injuring someone; and even the nonin-
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Because this and the other two forms of inequity are likely to remain
troubling to many observers of the tort system, pressure for contin-
ued reform of this sort is likely to continue.
In addition to reducing inequity among claimants, I have ar-
gued that the reforms I have canvassed draw heavily on the devices
employed by non-tort compensation systems. In my view the expla-
nation is twofold. First, many of the reformers find the non-tort sys-
tems appealing, and are willing to settle for half-a-loaf rather than
none. 6 They get half a compensation system-one operated by a
court rather than an insurance company or government agency, or
one in which tort liability is not abolished but is made optional.
There is every reason to expect that this kind of pressure will con-
tinue. For example, my colleague Jeffrey O'Connell has created sev-
eral new forms of elective no-fault in recent years and some are now
being adopted. 7 This development is likely to encourage no-fault
reformers.
The second reason for the appeal of non-tort systems is that the
scope of tort liability has been expanding for at least the last cen-
tury. Politically, the time for a quid pro quo seems to have come.
More and more people have the right to recover in tort. When the
scope of tort liability was limited and defenses were many, full indi-
vidualization and unlimited damages seemed sensible. As liability
has expanded and the defenses to it have withered away, for at least
some reformers a trade-off was overdue. The features of non-tort
systems that award lower levels of compensation in return for pro-
viding compensation to more victims appear to be an appealing
trade for this expansion in the scope of liability. For many the full
sured actor mitigates the effect of such bad legal luck through what amounts to self-
insurance if that actor has a sufficiently broad base of claims experience to be a repeat
player. The argument for imposing liability for creating risk in order to mitigate the
impact of legal luck is therefore much weaker from defendants' than from plaintiffs'
perspective.
86. The logic of this development (if not also the history) proceeds as follows: First,
the weaknesses of the traditional conception of tort law are recognized. Next, serious
consideration is given to the adoption of non-tort liability and compensation systems
that would supplement or displace the traditional conception, but the political and tech-
nical obstacles to the construction of such systems are recognized. Attention therefore
turns again to reform within the tort system. Tort reforms are then formulated that in
one way or another attempt to capture the benefits of the infeasible compensation-sys-
tem alternatives to tort liability, while avoiding the disadvantages of these alternatives.
This progression is not a figment of my interpretive imagination; it is explicit, for exam-
ple, in the recent study group report on tort reform to the American Law Institute. See 1
ENTERPRISE LIABILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 23, at 6-7.
87. See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell, A Model Bill Allowing Choice Between Auto Insurance Pay-
able With and Without Regard to Fault, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 947, 947-51 (1990).
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trade has not yet been completed, however, and for this reason too I
would expect more reform that makes tort liability look increasingly
like non-tort law.
It should go without saying that whether all these changes are
desirable is a separate matter. One might think that dealing with the
risk ofjury prejudice by standardizing awards and ignoring diversity
is a bad idea. One might favor the development of more non-tort
compensation systems, but think that trying to transform tort law
into a non-tort system is not sensible. Or one might favor the latter
idea, but object to certain of the reforms that are employed to
achieve the transformation of tort law. I happen to think, for exam-
ple, that placing absolute dollar caps on pain and suffering damages
burdens precisely the wrong people-those who have suffered seri-
ous injuries early in their lives-because they are the people who are
most likely to receive a large recovery. Scheduling damages for all
claimants makes much more sense to me.
But all that is a matter for another day. The first task is to un-
derstand the underlying significance and common direction of con-
temporary tort reform. Having gained a grasp of that significance,
we can then undertake the normative task of assessing the wisdom
of the reforms. Then at least we would not be debating the simplis-
tic question of whether a particular reform does or should benefit
plaintiffs or defendants. We could instead address more compli-
cated and difficult questions involving how to handle diversity,
which forms of equity among claimants are preferable, and tort law's
proper relationship with the non-tort systems that are its institu-
tional relatives. That is the kind of tort reform debate toward which
we ought to be heading.
CONCLUSION
Let me conclude by emphasizing that my analysis has been of-
fered in the spirit of interpretation, and indeed interpretation of an
unfinished and evolving text. The multiple authors of the text prob-
ably would not recognize it in my interpretation. The whole text of
tort reform, however, may not only be greater than the sum of its
parts, but different from that sum as well. Whether my own inter-
pretation will turn out to be correct, of course, depends on how the
text continues to be written. But whatever the significance and
shape of contemporary tort reform movement ultimately turn out to
be, the road to that completed text should be very exciting indeed.
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